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COMMISSIONS AND COURTS.
I. The Nature of Public Utilities and their Relation to the Public.
The term Public Utility is applied to that class of corporations
which serves the public under some privilege or franchise conferred
by the State. Since the State can alone enfranchise them, the
State may regulate and control their affairs. Formerly such regu-
lations as were deemed necessary were embodied in the charters by
which the companies were created, or in general laws or special
enactments under which they were incorporated, but it became
clear that no legislative body could properly control the various
operations in which the public are concerned. The sessions of a
legislature are necessarily brief, and its will is expressed in general
laws, which cannot in the nature of things cover special instances
requiring remedy. On the other hand the courts have the power
to correct certain abuses and see that the public is adequately
served; a court can declare a rate unreasonable, or a' preference
an unreasonable discrimination,, or a service inadequate, but a
court cannot make a new rate, or prescribe the method by which
the company can best serve the public. Its order settles one con-
troversy, involving one company and one patron. It cannot make
rules to govern all companies, because it is a court and not a legis-
lative body. To obviate these difficulties, resort was had some years
ago to Public Utility Commissions, created by law and clothed with
a power to regulate and control public utilities which neither the
legislatures or the courts were able to exercise.
II. The Commission Scheme.
A commission is a small body of appointed officials giving its
whole time to the establishment of just relations between public
utilities and their patrons. In recognition of the fact that many
of the details of business management are in some way reflected
in the rates and 'service furnished the public, the commissions were
given power to establish maximum rates, standards of quality,
uniform methods of book-keeping, to regulate the issue of stock,
bonds, and notes, to approve or disapprove the construction of
new plants or the extension of old ones, to decide whether monopoly
or competition be best in any given community; in fact to super-
vise every business detail which directly or indirectly affects the
relations between public utilities and their patrons. It may as
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a body decide controversies involving rates or standards, or upon
its own initiative, make investigations and issue general orders
affecting the whole class of public utilities investigated.
III. Constitutional Objections to the Scheme.
This, briefly, is the commission scheme. In putting it into
effect, some interesting constitutional questions have arisen. As
has just been pointed out, one function of a commission is to make
general rules and regulations governing all utilities of a certain
class; for instance, it may make a rule requiring all gas companies
in the State to supply gas of a certain standard. This appears to
be a legislative act, and immediately the question arose whether
the legislature could delegate its powers to such a body. One of
the early cases upon this point was Chicago & Northwestern R. Co.
vs. Dey, 1 L. R. A. 744, decided in 1888. The Iowa legislature
conferred upon the railroad commission of that State authority to
make and put in effect a schedule of rates for railroad transporta-
tion within the State. The Chicago & Northwestern brought a
suit to enjoin the enforcement of the rates established by the com-
mission under authority of that act, claiming that such an act un-
constitutionally delegated legislative powers to the commission.
It was held that there was no delegation of legislative powers. The
legislature had declared that rates should be reasonable. In fixing
a maximum rate, beyond which it would be unreasonable to charge,
the commission was only seeing that a law already established was
enforced. In other words, its functions were administrative and not
legislative. This may seem at first a rather technical solution but,
upon investigation, it seems difficult to draw any clear line between
what, in general, is a legislative act and what is mere administration.
Many rules of conduct are made by the administrative depart-
ments of any large city. The Park Department may keep one
off the grass at certain seasons; it may make rules governing the
hours when the public may use public swimming pools; it may
establish picnic grounds in certain parts of the park and exclude
picnics from others. The Street Department may close a street
and prevent the public using it until repairs are made. The police
may make traffic rules for the safety of the public. These are all
rules of conduct, but legislatures cannot make laws providing for
all these details. The administrative departments must be left
a certain discretion in order to perform their duties. In making
the above rules the departments are administering the law and not
acting in a legislative capacity. From these examples it is easy
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to see how many Instances arise in which the two functions are
nearly indistinguishable.
There is a broader way of viewing the whole question. The
legislature is entrusted with the responsibility of correcting abuses,
preventing unjust discriminations and excessive charges by public
utilities. It has power to do or cause to be done everything in any
manner and by any means, not in violation of some constitutional
provision, which is requisite to the complete and effectual accom-
plishment of this purpose. The constitution should be so inter-
preted, as not to render impotent and inoperative, but to preserve
and make effective, the sovereign power of the state to remedy
and correct these conditions. It is true that the legislature cannot
delegate the right to enact a law, but when powerless to make
rules and regulations to fit every case and to prevent every abuse,
it becomes proper for the legislature, having passed a general law
to accomplish' its public purposes, to leave to designated public
officials, within definite limitations, authority to make the necessary
rules and regulations for the complete operation and enforcement
of the general law. Two recent cases hold that the duty of such
officials is administrative and not legislative.' In the first case the
commission passed a demurrage rule with respect to freight in
carload lots; in the second case the commission made certain rules
establishing a uniform system of bookkeeping for interstate carriers.
In both cases it was held that, in making the rules, the commission
was acting within the limitations prescribed by the general law
and was simply doing what the legislature could not "do itself, that
is, seeing that the law was effectively administered.
Besides making rules and regulations, a commission has to
determine the facts upon which the general law operates. A statute
may provide that no railroad shall discriminate in rates between
shippers given the same service. To determine in any given case
whether the statute has been complied with, the commission must
determine a great number of facts. What appears at first to be
discrimination may be legal and proper, because of unusual traffic
conditions. To understand these conditions and determine the
facts in any particular case, hearings are necessary, witnesses must
be heard, and papers produced.
Immediately the question arises as to whether the commission
is not usurping the functions of the judiciary. In other words,
'State vs. Atlantic Coast Line, 32 L. R. A. (NS) 639; Interstate Commerce
Commission vs. Goodrich Tire Co., 224 U. S. 194.
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is not a body which holds hearings to decide controversies, to deter-
mine questions of fact, and which is given power to subpoena wit-
nesses and order the production of books and papers,-is not such
a body acting as a court? This theory has been advanced in a num-
ber of cases, in States whose constititions provide that the powers
of government shall be divided into three departments, the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial, and declare that no person charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one, shall exercise
any functions appertaining to either of the others. The theory
is plausible, but is refuted by the cases. The legislature could
have appointed a committee of its members to do just what the
commissions are doing, and it could have held hearings and heard
witnesses and yet nobody would think of attacking such action on
the ground that the legislature was trying to act as a court. As
the U. S. Supreme Court has said in a recent case, it is the nature
of the final act which determines the nature of the previous inquiry.2
To make laws necessitates a knowledge of facts and conditions, and
it would be destroying or crippling the whole usefulness of a legis-
lature to say that it could not investigate before it made laws.
It being impractical for the legislature itself to make the investi-
gation, it has appointed as its instrument, for that purpose, a com-
mission of experts. In the last analysis the objection that a body
created by the legislature cannot exercise judicial functions is not
of vital importance. As has been said in a recent case: "The divi-
sion of governmental powers into executive, legislative and judicial,
while of great importance in the creation or organization of a state
and from the viewpoint of institutional law, is not an exact classi-
fication. No such exact delimitation of governmental powers is pos-
sible."3
So far, then, we have shown that the legislature may create
a commission of experts and give to it the power to supervise and
control public utility organizations, being guided by, and its powers
limited by, the general law establishing the commission. Such
a commission may make rates, determine controversies, hear evidence
and subpoena witnesses, and this may be done without violating
the constitutional principles against delegation of the law-inaking
power, or taking over that of interpretation, or the general prin-
ciple that no person charged with the exercise of powers belonging
2L. & N. Ry. Co. vs. Ky. Ry. Commission, 231 U. S. 298; Ky. Bridge Co.
vs. L. & N. Ry. Co., 37 Fed. 567; Neb. Tel. Co. vs. State, 55 Neb. 627.
3State, ex rel Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co. vs. Ry. Commission, 52 Wash. 17.
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to one department of government, shall exercise any functions ap-
pertaining to the others.
There was a crying need for proper regulation of public utilities.
General laws had been tried and had failed. They did not fit
all the cases, and laws could not be framed that did. Furthermore,
such laws were not self-executing. They could be disobeyed and the
courts were not an adequate protection to the public. By establish-
ing commissions of experts that end could be accomplished and the
legislature could perform its duties to the public. Courts did not
look with favor on technical doctrines which stood in the way of
accomplishing a great good. Moreover, there is no inherent vice
either in a legislature delegating its authority, or in an instrument
of one department exercising functions of another department.
There is at least one State which has openly clothed its railroad com-
mission with legislative, judicial and executive powers, and whose
courts have held that this was perfectly consistentwith its constitution.
Its courts recognize that the administration of government would
be wholly impractical if the maxim that the three departments of
government should be separate and distinct, "were strictly, literally,
and unyieldingly applied in every possible situation." This was
held in Nor. & P. Belt Line R. Co. vs. Commission, 103 Va. 294.
It has also been held that when a State constitution sees fit to unite
legislative and judicial powers in one body, there is nothing to hinder
so far as the constitution of the United States is concerned.4
IF. Relation of Commissions to the Courts.
We have been dealing with questions that have arisen with
regard to the validity of the commission scheme, generally. But
what we are mainly concerned with is the relation of these com-
missions to those under their jurisdiction and to the courts. What
restraints are there upon a commission's powers? Which of its
rules must be obeyed? What orders are final? Are its findings of
fact conclusive? When can an order be appealed from to the
courts? What is the nature of the appeal and what questions can
be raised on appeal? In answering any of these questions two
considerations must be constantly kept in mind: First, a com-
mission is primarily an administrative body; second, it must obey
the law of the land.
'Prentis vs. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210.
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A. Commission is an Administrative Body.
Because it is an administrative body and composed of men
expert in handling utility problems, its orders ordinarily ought not
to be interfered with by the courts, and ought not to be set aside
save with the greatest reluctance. As most of the courts put it,
when the wisdom or expediency of an order of a commission and
not the power to make it, is at issue, the finding of the commission must
be conclusive. To decide otherwise would be to destroy the use-
fulness of the commission because, if its finding is not conclusive
every question of policy would ultimately have to be thrashed
out in the courts, and the case before the commission would be in
the nature of a preliminary hearing only; which is obviously far
from the intent of the legislatures. The United States Supreme
Court has taken this position flatly with respect to the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Certain grain dealers of Atlanta complained
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, of an alleged dis-
crimination by the L. & N. R. R. against them in favor of the grain
dealers in Nashville. A reshipping privilege was granted in Nash-
ville and refused in Atlanta. The railroad attempted to justify
the practice on the ground that there was water competition at
Nashville and none at Atlanta. After a hearing the Commission
decided in favor of the Atlanta merchants, that the practice was
an unreasonable preference to Nashville in violation of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, and entered an order accordingly. In a suit
brought by the railroad to enjoin the order, the Commerce Court
decided that the practice was of long standing and was justified
by water competition at Nashville, and therefore issued the in-
junction. In reversing the decision of the Comhnerce Court, the
Supreme Court held that the Commerce Court had no right to
substitute its judgment as to the existence of a preference for that
of the Commission; that the very purpose for which the Com-
mission was created, was to bring into existence a body, which from
its peculiar character, would be most fitted to decide whether, from
the facts disputed or undisputed in a given case, preference or
discrimination existed."
But in some States, Missouri among thein, the section of the
public utilities acts, providing for a review in the courts, almost
5U. S. vs. L. & N. Rv., 231 U. S. 314; Interstate Commerce Commission vs.
Ill. Central, 215 U. S. 452; Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Union Pa.
Ry., 222 U. S. 541; Hocking Valley Ry. Co. vs. Public Utility Commission,
Ohio Supreme Court, 1915.
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seems to nullify this principle. For instance, Section 111 of the
Missouri Act provides: "the applicant may apply to the Circuit
Court * * * for a writ of review for the purpose of having the
reasonableness or lawfulness of the original order inquired into or
determined. * * * Suits * * * shall be tried and determined as
suits in equity." How is this section to be construed? If it means
tEat every order of a commission can be reviewed in the courts and
set aside if the court disagrees with the commission, even when
the disagreement is only on a question of.policy, then Sec. Ill
has to a great extent nullified the usefulness of our Commission.
If no question is final, then the courts alone will shape every policy
in regard to public utility questions. A recent Missouri case on
this subject construes Sec. 111 of our public utilities act, to mean.
that, when an order is reviewed in the courts, they will consider
the evidence sent up de novo as a court of equity, and give to the
findings of the commission such weight and consideration ay they
may deem them entitled to under the law and the evidence. 6 The
facts in the case were these: The commission upon complaint and
after a full hearing ordered two railroads to construct a connecting
or interchange track. In the commission's opinion the evidence
on the traffic conditions justified the expenditure that compliance.
with the order would have entailed on the roads. The Supreme
Court, upon a writ of review, considered the matter upon the evi-
dence sent up, came to the opposite conclusion and reversed the
commission's action. The case was decided correctly for the evi-
dence plainly failed to show that enough traffic would go over the
connectiqn to justify the expense of constructing it. There was
practically no evidence at all upon this question, and the testimony
of certain experts was mere conjecture. Now it is plain that a com--
mission cannot make an order involving a great expense without
evidence of public demand or necessity, or upon evidence wholly
conjectural. To do so would violate the "due process" clause of
the constitution. It is upon this principle alone the case should
have been decided. But one of the points raised in the argument
was that the findings of the commission are final and conclusive
upon the courts. It was in answer to this contention that the
Supreme Court construed Sec. 111 to give it the right to review the
evidence and try the case de novo, as upon an appeal from a chancellor's
decree. The proper answer to the argument and the answer, in
4C. B. & Q. Ry. vs. Public Service Commission, P. U. R. 1916 (B) 367.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
the writer's opinion that the Court should have made, is that, when
a constitutional right is alleged to have been invaded, the Court
will review all the findings of a commission because a consideration
of all the evidence is necessary to determine whether the right
has been invaded. As an example of the unsoundness of the "trial
de novo" theory, consider the following case: Suppose our com-
mission should undertake an investigation into the water rate situl-
tion in Saint Louis, and should find that the practice of allowing
a manufacturer a lower rate than anyone else using the same quan-
tity of water, was unjust and discriminatory; and that upon such
finding it should make an order fixing the same rate for manufac-
turers and all others using the same quantity of water. If the
manufacturer appealed to the courts, could they go into the whole
matter, and, if in their opinion the lower rate to manufacturers was
proper, reverse the commission and vacate the order? It cannot
be held so, upon any sound interpretation of our Act. The legis-
lature has deferred such questions to the discretion of the commission,
with which the courts cannot interfere.
A most interesting and anomalous situation arises when it is
a negative order that is appealed from; in other words, when the
commission's refusal to act is complained of; not a case where the
commission has refused to consider legal evidence, for in that case
clearly the courts can direct them to hear the evidence and make
a new finding; but when, upon all the evidence offered, the com-
mission dismisses the complaint or application. For instance, an
electric company is incorporated to do business in Kansas City
and obtains a franchise from that City to use its streets, for that
purpose. The Company applies to the commission for the certi-
ficate of public convenience and necessity required before a new com-
pany may enter a territory already served. After a hearing the
commission is of the opinion that the established company in Kansas
City is adequately serving the citizens of that City and that it
would be an economic waste to allow another company to enter
the field. An order therefore is made denying the application.
A writ of review is taken to the courts. Suppose the courts should
disagree with the commission upon the question of allowing a new
company to come in. What would be the effect of reversing the
commission? The court can't issue the certificate. It can't remand
the case with directions to issue the certificate for that would
be equivalent to doing it itself.7 The court cannot exercise the
7Public Service Co. vs. Public Utility Board, 84 N. J. L. 463; Brooklyn Union
Gas Co. vs. N. Y., 188 N. Y. 334.
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discretion which the legislature has entrusted to the commission;
moreover, to do so would be exercising not a judicial but an ad-
ministrative function. If a shipper complained to the conimis-
sion of an extortionate rate and his complaint were dismissed,
the same situation would be reached. Even if the court found the
rate to be too high in its opinion, still it could not fix a lower rate
or order the commission to do so, because rate making is legisla-
tive and a court has no legislative powers. The practical effect
is that where, upon the merits of the case after hearing 'all the evi-
dence, the commission finds complainant is entitled to no relief
and refuses to act, its finding is conclusive and the courts can give
no relief.
There are certain preliminary questions upon which the validity
of a commission's order does not depend, which cannot be raised in
the courts, and upon which the commission's finding is final. For
instance, take a case of extortionate rates. A shipper complains
that a railroad's rates are too high. A commission, before estab-
lishing a new- rate, must be convinced that the existing rate is too
high, and hears evidence to establish that fact. It then has to
determine what the new rate ought to be. A good many utilities
have erroneously taken the view that whether their existing rates
were too high or not, is a question for the courts, as well as .the rea-
sonableness of the new rate established by the commission. Their
error is evident when it is remembered the lawfulness of the com-
mission's order, is the only question with which the courts are con-
cerned. Railroad attorneys have even gone so far as to claim
that while a road is charging reasonable rates it is within its con-
stitutional rights; that before a commission can have jurisdiction
to fix a new rate the existing rate must be shown to be unreasonable;
and that upon this question the railroad is entitled to a judicial
hearing in the courts. This view however, has been flatly condemned
by Justice Hughes in the Louisville and Nashville case, 231 U. S.
298.
B. Commissions are Governed by Three Principles of Law.
(1). A Commission Is Subject to The Same Constitutional
Limitations As The Legislature Creating It.
The fact, then, that we are dealing with an administrative body
created by the legislature is one reason for the peculiar relationship
between these commissions and our courts. To completely under-
stand this relationship three general principles of law applying to
commissions must be mastered. First, commissions are subject to
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the same constitutional limitations as the legislatures creating
them; they cannot deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law, nor deny to anyone the equal protection of
the law. For example, we have the common case of confiscatory
rates. A confiscatory rate is one which does not yield a fair return
upon the reasonable value of the property being used to serve the
public. What is a fair return and what the reasonable value of
the property upon which the return is to be based, must become
questions for the court, in order that it may determine whether the
constitutional right has been infringed. Realizing however that
upon such questions as valuation and return a commission created
to deal with just such problems is better qualified to form an opinion,
the courts will set aside an order fixing rates alleged to be confis-
catory only upon a clear showing of that fact. Where a rate has
been fixed by the commission but never put into effect, courts are
very unwilling to enjoin them until the new rates are given a fair
trial by continuing the business with these rates in force; espec-
ially where the evidence shows a narrow line of division between
possible confiscation and proper regulation and the division depends
upon variant opinions as to value and as to results in the future from
operation under' such rates.8 Whenever a clear showing is made
that a rate is confiscatory, however, whether it is a rate to bezput
into effect or one under which the utility has operated, the courts
do not hesitate to enjoin or set aside the order fixing such rate.
Commissions are given power to order construction' of addi-
tions to the plants of utilities, involving often very great expense.
They may compel a street railway to make an extension of its track
or a railroad to build an interchange track connecting it with an-
other road and this power is sometimes abused. If conditions in
a particular case fail to justify the expense to the utility, its property
rights are infringed and it can resort to the courts to protect them.
In a very recent case this principle was applied. The Great Northern
R. R. had established stock scales in some of its stock yards, altho
under no obligation to do so. A village in which no scales had been
installed complained to the state commission on the ground of an
unjust discrimination. The commission ordered the road to estab-
lish a six-ton stock scale at the village in question. To comply
with this order meant a considerable expense to the road, which ap-
pealed to the courts to protect its rights. The case went to the
OWilcox vs. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 191. "
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Supreme Court of the United States where it was decided that such
an order deprived the road of property without due process of
law, because the road was not even given a chance to remove its
scales in the other towns and so end the discrimination. 9 A com-
mission cannot manage the utilities it was created to regulate, nor
can it impose on the road a duty which was no part of its original
undertaking. As Justice Hughes has said, "Broad as is the power
of regulation the State does not enjoy the freedom of an owner.
The public interest cannot be invoked as a justification for demand
which pass the limits of reasonable protection, and seek to impose
upon the carrier and its property burdens that are not incident to
its engagement."' 1
(2). Has Only the Powers Given to It by Statute.
The second principle of law is that a commission, deriving its
powers only from statute, can do what the law creating it permits
and nothng else. The courts then must keep the commission within
the act, and any question involving the extent of the commission's
powers under the act or the interpretation of any terms of the act,
must be finally settled in the courts. For instance the Interstate
Commerce Commission Act provides for a complaint to the Com-
mission when an interstate railroad refuses to establish a switch
connection with another line. Not a shipper, but a local railroad
brought a complaint asking for such a switch connection. The
question was whether the Act gave such a road any right to com-
plain. The commission acting on the theory that it did, ordered
the interstate road to make the connection. But in suit brought to
enjoin the order the Supreme Court of the United States differently
construed the Act, decided the Act gave no such right, and granted
the injunction." In another case the commission set aside a new
schedule of rates put in force by a railroad, and ordered the restora-
tion of the old rates. It based its action not on the power to con-
demn unjust and unreasonable rates and fix reasonable ones, but upon
the assumption that it had the right to protect certain lumber in-
terests from the consequences of a change in rates. This the court
held it had no right to do, the statutes giving it no right to interfere
on such grounds. 12
'Great Northern vs. Minn., 238 U. S. 340.
'Northern Pa. Ry. Co. vs. North Dakota, U. S. S. C. 1914.
"Interstate Commerce Commission vs. D. L. & W. Coal Co., 216 U. S. 531.
"Southern Pa. Ry. Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S.
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All questions of jurisdiction are pure questions of law for the
courts to determine and a decision of the commission as to its own
jurisdiction has very little weight. Whenever,,therefore, a commis-
sion attempts to interfere in a matter over which it has no juris-
diction, the courts will declare its action illegal and void. If a
case is improperly dismissed on the theory of want of jurisdiction,
the courts will remand the case with directions to hear and deter-
mine the case on the merits.
(3). A Commission's Powers Being Delegated, It Must Exer-
cise Them in a Reasonable Way.
Commissions were established for a public purpose. They were
created to do what neither the legislature nor the courts were com-
petent to do, to establish just relations between public utilities and
the public they serve. Their powers were delegated to them by the
legislature in trust to be used for the public good. It is a well recog-
.nized rule of law that while courts may not interfere with the legiti-
mate use of a delegated legislative power, they may interfere to
prevent its abuse. Whenever, therefore, it is evident that an order
of a commission is the result of fraud or of whim or caprice merely,
imposing a burden upon the company to which it is applicable,
without any corresponding benefit to the community which the
company serves, the courts will interfere for the company's pro-
tection. A commission has power to order a street railway to
change its route when public convenience and necessity demand
it. If, however, a commission should order a track to be removed
from certain streets and it could be shown to the court that the
removal was clearly ordered in the interest of certain property owners
and not because the public interest demanded the change, the court
would set aside the order as unreasonable and arbitrary. There is
no place in our form of government 'for a small body of appointed
officers with arbitrary powers. Such a body can be given a very
wide discretion and courts will not interfere with a just exercise
of that discretion, but they will jealously guard against its abuse
in the form of capricious or arbitrary action. This principle has
long been applied to all acts of municipal assemblies."3 All city
ordinances, as they are based on an exercise of dilegated legislative
authority, must be reasonable. Although it may not have been stated
in quite this way in the cases, this principle has been applied by the
lSSt. L. vs. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Corrigan vs. Gage, 68 Mo. 541; Skinker vs.
Heman, 148 Mo. 349; St. L. vs. the Theatre Co., 202 Mo. 690.
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courts to commissions. It must be what Justice Lamar meant
when, in explaining the position of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, he said, "an order regular on its face may be set aside if
the authority therein involved has been exercised in such an un-
reasonable manner as to cause it to be within the elementary rule
that the substance and not the shadow, determines the validity
of the exercise of the power."' 14
F. Conclusion.
A commission, then, is primarily an administrative body charged
with the duty of supervising and controlling the operations of public
service corporations. In order, however, that it may discharge
its functions it is compelled to summon witnesses, to hear evidence,
to decide controversies, and establish rules of conduct and must
therefore exercise powers which are essentiallr judicial and legis-
lative. The courts recognizing the need for the exercise of all these
functions, and realizing that it is impossible in any event to draw
a clear line between what is legislative, what judicial and what
merely administrative, have allowed the commissions a wider lat-
titude than, under the constitutions of the states, they allow to
the departments of the government proper.
The courts will not substitute their own judgment for that of
the commission when a mere exercise of discretion is involved and
because they think a different conclusion might have been arrived
at. Neither will a court act for the commission. If they declare
a rule of the commission illegal, they cannot make a new one, for
to do so is beyond the judicial power. They cannot legislate. A
commission's powers however, are limited by certain principles of
law, which the courts do enforce. It cannot violate the consti-
tution by taking property without due process of law. It can do
what the act creating it permits and nothing else. Its powers are
delegated, therefore it must use them reasonably and in the interest
of the public, and not capriciously or arbitrarily.
J. S. LIONBERGER.
"Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Union Pa. Ry. Co., 222 U. S. 541;
Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Ill. Central, 215 U. S. 452.
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